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TRANSYLVANIA

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Eighteen hundred years ago, Transylvania was part of the Roman province of Dacia. Of its previous history, we know next to nothing. The north-and-south Carpathian range, which forms the two hundred miles or so of its eastern boundary, has been merely scratched for evidence of early races of men; but these scattered explorations have disclosed a region as rich in such remains as any in Europe. The character of these mountains has had much to do with the curious history of the territory on each side. They divide Transylvania (until recently the easternmost part of Hungary) from Moldavia, the northern half of Rumania. North of present-day Moldavia is the old Moldavian territory of Bukovina, which contains the former Moldavian capital, Suceava, the burial place of the kings. Dividing Bukovina on the east from the extreme northern part of Transylvania on the West, the Carpathian range bends northwestward (and later almost due west), continuing another three hundred miles or so. The north-and-south part of this mountain chain is quite high, and rises so abruptly from the plain to the eastward that it formed an effective barrier to primitive race movements. Military roads have been constructed of late years, but these abound in very steep climbs. The few passes are high, the folding generally parallel with the range.

From the southern end of this chain, the Transylvanian Alps extend almost due west, forming the boundary between Transylvania and Wallachia, the southern portion of Rumania. These mountains are also quite high, but are pierced with some easy passes. In the east, the railroad from Kronstadt (Brasov) runs southward to Bucarest over fairly easy grades. In the center, the old Roman road

follows the gorge cut by the Olt River southward through the mountains to Slatina on the Wallachian plain. This is one of the most beautiful automobile drives in the world, and there are not even moderately steep grades in it. Still further westward, the river Jiu breaks southward through the mountains on its way to the Danube.

The Theiss or Tisza River rises on the western slope of the Carpathian range, flows generally westward then south-westward to a point East of Budapest, (and some 250 miles west of the Carpathians,) then turns to flow almost due south another 200 miles, emptying into the Danube just above Belgrade. The territory included between this river, a short stretch of the Danube, the Transylvanian Alps and the Carpathians is shaped somewhat like the map of Australia and oriented in almost the same way. This vast country, about 300 miles from east to west at the widest place and slightly less from north to south, has been assigned by the Peace Conference to Rumania, Jugoslavia (Greater Serbia) and Hungary. They are all dissatisfied with the award. Especially are Hungary and Rumania discontented; Hungary because so much of the western part went to Rumania, Rumania because the southwestern part, the Banat of Temeshvar, was divided between her and Jugoslavia, whereas in the secret treaty of August 17, 1916 the Entente promised her the whole of it.

Probably the best way to give an idea of the merits of such a complicated case, involving geography, history, racial majority, economics, politics and military defensibility among other things, is for some unprejudiced neutral who is familiar with the disputed region to set down a sketchy account of how conditions came to be as they are. In this general historical introduction we must keep the main geographical peculiarities of the country constantly in mind.

When the Romans first came in contact with the people north of the lower Danube a little over a hundred years before the Christian era, these had evidently been fairly stabilized for a long time with the general boundaries of the "Greater Rumania" of 1920. Herodotus mentions

them as allies of Philip of Macedon. A little later, Alexander the Great burned some of their villages because they helped certain Thracian tribes against him. He did not do a very thorough job, however, and fifty years later these Getae captured his successor Lysimachus, took him to their capital in Transylvania and only released him upon payment of a heavy ransom in gold. Some of these gold pieces, bearing his name, have recently been dug up in Transylvania.

These rather highly-organized tribes of Getae and Dacians made the Romans a great deal of trouble. In 111 B.C. we find them fighting the Roman legions along the Danube. Julius Caesar was preparing an expedition against them at the time of his death. In the ensuing civil war they sided with Anthony. Augustus had intermittent wars with them, and there is record of an alliance in which he called them the "friends and allies of the Roman people." In 86 A.D. they defeated two Roman generals and drove the legions back to the Balkan Mountains. Emperor Domitian won some local battles against them, and finally secured a precarious peace by agreeing to pay an annual tribute to the Dacian king. Carefully concealing this latter fact from the popular view, he actually held a triumph at Rome to celebrate his alleged conquest of the country and added "The Dacian" to his titles.

After two terrific wars, Emperor Trajan finally conquered the whole of Dacia in 106 A.D., left garrisons, built roads and began to exploit the mining and agricultural resources of the country. The only extensive gold mines in Europe were in Transylvania, then as now. The Romans penetrated this region by way of the level Banat, opposite Belgrade, and across the passes in the Transylvanian Alps especially the easy slopes of the Olt River gorge. The Roman capital was at Apulum, the modern Karlsburg. Many immigrants came in from various parts of the Empire, and the Dacians so completely abandoned their language for the easy, adequate colloquial Latin that not a trace of the original Dacian dialect remains. The country became so fabulously prosperous that it is called "Dacia Felix" on

the Roman medals. Dacia was a Roman province for 165 years. Abandoned to the Goths in 271 A.D., it was temporarily reconquered by Emperor Constantine about 330, but the Romans were unable to hold it. The Asiatic race movements were already beginning.

During the next thousand years or more, the Carpathian mountain barrier, discussed above, is one of the most outstanding facts in the history not only of Transylvania, but of Europe. One Asiatic horde after another, interspersed with European race fragments fleeing before the irresistible Orientals, swept into what is now Moldavia—northern Rumania. They came westward through the gap between the southern end of the Ural range and the Caspian Sea, followed the steppes just North of the Black Sea until they were confronted by the frowning Carpathian wall, then turned southward. Keeping to the plain, some 200 miles wide, between the Carpathians and the western shore of the Black Sea, the emigrant hordes crossed the Danube and descended by way of the Balkan passes into the Eastern Roman Empire. Only a few fragments straggled across the main part of the Carpathian barrier into Transylvania.

There are two or three negotiable passes about the head waters of the Theiss (Tisza) in the extreme northeastern part of Transylvania. One of the two wings of the Hunnic invasion of about 375 A.D. penetrated here, descended by the Theiss Valley floor north and west of the Transylvanian valleys, and here split in two. One part swept westward toward Châlons and defeat, the other turned south and entered what is now Bulgaria. The Magyars or Hungarians appear to have come in by the same route in the tenth century. These took up their residence on the western bank of the Theiss. They were defeated by the Germans in an attempt to expand toward the Northwest, so they spread eastward to the foothills of Transylvania proper.

Here we should remark that East of the Theiss River itself the level valley floor is from 50 to 75 miles wide—more in several places. This became almost entirely Hungarian (Magyar). But Transylvania proper is a network of valleys, separated by much higher mountain

ridges than a glance at most of our maps would suggest. Incidentally, it is one of the most beautiful countries in the world.

Thus while the Slavs and Magyars, lowland peoples, were settling in Hungary and the Balkans, thus completely changing the character of the population of most of south-east Europe, Transylvania's lofty isolation made it a sort of stable "island," surrounded by a seething flood of invading settlers and pure adventurers. This relatively inaccessible territory geographically includes both the Carpathians and the Transylvanian Alps. The latter have very long and quite broken southern slopes, extending in many places 50 or 75 miles southward into Old Rumania. In the mountains may still be found the headdress to match that shown on the Trajan column at Rome. Occasional references to these people during the middle ages mention them as "former colonists of the Romans." Their speech is as Latin as is Italian or Spanish, though it sounds more strange to us because the non-Latin element is largely Slavic, whereas the other Romance languages, in common with English, contain many Teutonic words. The Greek Orthodox priesthood accounts for a sprinkling of Greek words, and there are also some of Turkish origin. The Slavic are evidently superimposed. For example, for "good man" in English (both Teutonic) words, these Transylvanians say "om bun"—both Latin, as are nearly all of the commonest words used in everyday speech.

The race problem in Transylvania is bound to be peculiar because while the rest of southeastern Europe was getting mixed up and readjusted, this region was protected rather by its geographical character than by its organization or powers of resistance. Being a network of valleys, it was inevitably weak politically in an age whose mode of life did not compel daily intercourse between one valley and the next. The barbarian invasions *via* southern Russia practically over, solid Rumanian political organizations came into existence almost immediately on the Wallachian and Moldavian plains. Not so in Transylvania, of which the Magyars took possession in the 11th century. The

Szecklers, an Asiatic tribe related to the Magyars, were settled in almost a solid block against the extreme eastern frontier of Transylvania. Some Saxons were colonized in the southern part in the twelfth century, and reinforced from time to time afterward. These were important at different periods as relays in the trade with southeastern Europe and as frontier guards against Islam.

Sultan Solyman the Magnificent took Buda, the Hungarian capital, in 1526, King Louis II being slain in the preliminary battle, Solyman sanctioned the election of Zapolya, Prince of Transylvania, to succeed him. The Turks never entirely relinquished their sovereignty over Transylvania and eastern Hungary until 1698—though it was fitful and inconsistent. In the meantime, Michael the Brave of Wallachia began a revolt against the Turks in 1593, in which he ravaged the Sultan's lands clear to the gates of Adrianople. Prince Sigismund of Transylvania, his ally, deserted him in 1596 and made peace with the Sultan. The vigorous Michael retaliated by conquering and annexing Transylvania. He also placed himself on the throne of Moldavia, holding all the Rumanian lands until his death in 1601. He was murdered by a Greek, Basta, in Austrian pay, as a result of a general conspiracy between the Turks, Germans, Hungarians and Slavs against the Latins who stood in their way. His political structure fell to pieces. Always the Turks had at least a nominal suzerainty, and Transylvania was usually under the rule of some Magyar satellite of the Porte, united with some part of Hungary. During the period of 172 years between the capture of Buda in 1526 and the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1698, interminable wars were waged between the Habsburgs and the Sultans. By the Carlowitz treaty, Transylvania became an Austrian Crown land. Austria also gained a suzerainty over all of Hungary North of the Marosch and West of the Theiss Rivers.

By the treaty of Passarowitch in 1718, Austria got the remainder of Hungary. Thus through the long Ottoman episode, Hungary lost her independence. Her rule over Transylvania, at times real and at others merely nominal,

had been succeeded by Austrian control. Austrian rule was not particularly oppressive except on isolated occasions. The Hungarians never forgot or forgave the shrinkage in their frontiers or the loss of their sovereignty. Their subsequent struggle with Austria up to 1867 is dealt with in sufficient detail in general treatises on European history.

One fact should be remarked, however—that many of the English versions of the revolution of 1848, as it affected Hungary, are likely to create an erroneous idea of the relative weight of the factors involved. In March of that year, Hungary was guaranteed a constitution and virtual independence. Taking advantage of the general disorder and the break-up by General Windischgrätz's troops of the Pan-Slavic Congress at Prague in June, the Hungarians declared their complete independence of the Habsburg crown and set up a republic under the Presidency of Kossuth. We in the West have shed many idle tears over the way Austria, aided by 50,000 Russian troops, reconquered Hungary. As a matter of fact, the Hungarian chauvinists themselves brought this misfortune upon their country. Remembering their past glories, the Magyars attempted to set up quite as despotic a control over the South Slavs and the Rumanians of Transylvania as they themselves had suffered at the hands of Austria. Evidently the two subject races involved thought it would be worse. The South Slavs (Jugoslavs) appealed to Russia. What was really the last straw was the violent opposition of the Transylvanians to this change of masters. They lent their full military support to Austria. The result is well known.

Transylvania's real troubles began in 1867, when Hungary forced Austria, after the disastrous war with Prussia, to grant her complete independence under the Habsburg crown and also to relinquish to her both Rumanian Transylvania and the South Slav territories. Up to this time, German cities and Szeckler colonies had been planted on the frontiers next to Turk-controlled Rumania, and there had been some general oppression; but no systematic attempt to denationalize the country had been made. Since then, the Hungarian government has sought to

Magyarize it by whatever methods seemed likely to prove efficacious.

Americans should try to avoid intolerance in judging either side of a struggle of this sort. We are inclined to be vain about our "melting-pot." Evidently, however, it is one thing to admit foreigners a person or family at a time into a country with its language, customs and local government already fairly fixed. This would, ideally, completely sever the association with the old environment, and at the same time furnish a powerful incentive to get oriented in and assimilated to the new. Even this is imperfectly successful when immigration is rapid and many of the immigrants settle in groups or semi-colonies in large cities. But it is an entirely different and more difficult thing to impose a new language and new ways upon a community or colony from without—to change, within the same environment, the speech and folkways which have become rooted in that particular spot for centuries. When the old language has the age, prestige and simplicity of the colloquial Latin, as in Transylvania, and the tongue it is sought to impose, whatever its merits, is Asiatic, with an utterly strange orthography, syntax, idiom and genius generally, the difficulty is raised to the *n*th power.

Neither do we dismiss the subject by simply crying for "self-determination." These nationalities are hopelessly mixed up together—by communities, not by families. In the extreme east there is a fairly large block of Szecklers—somewhat over a quarter of a million. But it is not purely Szeckler. Next to this to the southwest is another fairly large block of Germans—say sixty thousand in a territory of a fairly symmetrical shape which might be delimited. Around this pair of colonies, on every side, are substantially solid Rumanian settlements—not 100 per cent Rumanian, any more than the two mentioned above are 100 per cent Szeckler or German (Swabians—the Schässburg group is referred to). Klausenburg (Koloszvar, Cluj) is a German-Magyar-Jewish city in the center of a rather small Magyar colony (predominantly, not purely), surrounded by Rumanians. Temeshvar is a German-Magyar town in a con-

siderable German colony (but sprinkled with Rumanian, Serbian and Magyar communities), with Magyars to the southwest, Serbs to the west, Rumanians to the east and a rather slender island of Rumanians wedged in between the Germans and Magyars to the north. And so on around, to Hermannstadt (Nagy-Szeben, Sibiu), Kronstadt (Brassó, Braşov), etc.

These little patches of nationalities have had their own language and their own ways for a very long time. The country has enjoyed a fairly enlightened economic administration on the whole, and has become an interdependent unit in that respect. The German cities have developed considerable manufactures, and the exploitation of mines is important in some districts. These require interchange and exchange with the outside world of their products on more than a primitive scale. The lines of communication—roads, railways, telegraphs, telephones—are established, and radiate from Budapest.

The Peace Conference settlement gives most of the Serbs to Yugoslavia. But among these Serbs are settlements of other nationals. It is not incredible that some of the Rumanian communities thus put under Yugoslav rule have existed for the entire one thousand eight hundred years since the Romans. At least they have been there so long that the "mind of man runneth not to the contrary." The surrounding Slavs outnumber them overwhelmingly, but they have not been there so long—we know approximately when they settled in the territory. How are these Rumanian communities, for example, to be dealt with? Must they be made over into Slavs—learn the Slav language and adopt the Slav ways? It was to get around such difficulties that the Peace Conference insisted on holding a sort of mandate over minority nationalities within national boundaries. But it is an infringement of national sovereignty which no western European power would brook for a moment, except under military compulsion. Both Yugoslavia and Rumania long withheld their signatures from the peace treaty because of it, and it has already been a prime factor in the fall of cabinets in both countries.

This Banat settlement (division between Rumania and Jugoslavia) likewise makes the Hungarian and Transylvanian commerce on the Theiss River pass through Serb territory, since Jugoslavia has both banks of the Danube lower down. The Jugoslavs got the best of the bargain materially, considering the mineral and agricultural resources, and the developed industries in the towns. The Magyars and Germans were apparently more hardly used than anybody else, since the industries were largely in their hands. In many cases they are city groups, surrounded by Slav or Rumanian peasants, or a mixture.

The Peace Conference refused to consider a tentative Rumanian claim to the level valley floor east of the Theiss River (described above). This claim was based on the historical argument that the land was part of Roman Dacia, and the idea of its geographical and military unity with Transylvania. That is, the Theiss was assumed to be a "natural" frontier. There are some Rumanians in this strip from 50 to 75 miles wide, or still wider locally; but it is so obviously and overwhelmingly Magyar on the whole that the Conference could hardly do otherwise than leave it to Hungary. The writer covered it in some detail with officers of the Rumanian army during and after the recent Rumanian-Hungarian war (July-August, 1919). So few of the inhabitants speak Rumanian, German or French that it was often difficult to get information about the roads. An occasional Jew, functionary, gendarme, school-teacher or business man may be found who can be communicated with in German. Rumanian speaking people are encountered only on the rarest occasions. Most of the Rumanian army officers who talked with the writer on the subject, on the ground, realized the infinite difficulty involved in administering such a territory, whose language is not only foreign but Asiatic, and said frankly that they hoped it would be left in Hungary. Some people seriously entertained the (merely tentative) Rumanian claim on military or economic grounds. On the whole, however, it was regarded, I think I am safe in saying, as an offset to any attempt which might be made to detach southern Dobroudja or Bessarabia from Rumania.

Let us now consider as a whole the population of Transylvania as Rumania gets it, within the boundaries fixed by the Peace Conference. (The technical geographical error of calling this all Transylvania is of no consequence, since the reader is advised that by the term is meant all the territory which Rumania gets from Hungary.) The three chief races are the Rumanian, the Hungarian-Szeckler (best discussed together, since their differences are chiefly historical) and the German (Saxon, Swabian and a few Flemish, if we may believe the medieval chronicles). The statistics usually include all of the Banat, part of which goes to Yugoslavia; but the resulting relative error in any percentages given will be very slight, since the detached part contains few of any of the nationalities in question.

According to the Hungarian official statistics,¹ the Magyar population in Hungary increased from 4,812,000 in 1840 to 7,426,000 in 1890; and between the same dates the Rumanians increased from 2,202,000 to 2,589,000. These figures are obviously "queer," since the Rumanian element, largely peasants, is represented as practically stationary, while the Magyars, in much better economic circumstances on the whole, are shown as having increased by over 50 per cent. This is contrary to the way populations usually increase at different economic levels, in rural *vs.* urban environments, as shown by practically all the unbiased statistics collected in various countries on the subject. It is contradicted by other figures given in the same official Hungarian statistics for the same years. For instance, the Rumanians are Greek Catholics, the Magyars Roman Catholics. But the statistics by religious beliefs contradict those by races and suggest that the Rumanian increase was greater than the Magyar, which is what we should expect.

Coméne² goes into details as to how the Hungarians juggled these figures. He points out that the Hungarian

¹ Discussed in detail in Enescu, "Ardealul, Banatul, Crişana şi Marmuraru," Bucarest, 1915, pp. 10 f.

² Coméne, N. P., "Notes sur la Guerre Roumaine," Lausanne and Paris, 1917, pp. 43 f.

censuses for 1850 and 1890 show a decrease in the Rumanian population. The increase in Magyars for the whole of Hungary is given as 35.74 per cent for the 40 years; but for all non-Magyars only 6.23 per cent. This is impossible, unless a good many of the children of non-Magyars can fairly be classed as Magyars; which of course raises the question: "What constitutes a Magyar?" The question asked by the Magyar census-takers was not: "To what nationality do you belong?" It was: "What language do you speak from preference?" Since all positions of honor or emolument entailed the use of the official Hungarian language, it would not be strange if many people of Rumanian nationality who had been obliged to learn Magyar in the schools stated to an official census-taker that they used it from preference.

Even a cursory survey of the 1911 Hungarian Statistical Annual discloses absurdities. For example, the Magyar population in the county of Turocz shows an increase of 154 per cent between 1900 and 1910; in Zolyoni the increase claimed would be 82 per cent and in Lipto 60 per cent, etc.

Enescu adopts a method of correcting the figures by use of the rate of increase per thousand in Rumania, applied to the numbers given in the Austrian census before Transylvania was handed over to Hungary. The estimate thus arrived at (1915) was: 3,535,120 Rumanians, or 56.1 per cent; 1,200,755 Hungarians, or 19.1 per cent; and 730,962 Germans, or 11.6 per cent. But these figures will not do either, even after making a correction for the Rumanians who emigrated between the dates given—some 200,000 to America alone. Transylvania is, on the whole, a more highly developed country than the Old Kingdom, and the rate of increase has been consistently lower. Moreover, some of the non-Magyars have certainly become quite Magyarized. Colonization, or at least immigration, must be taken into account.

Lieutenant-Colonel Antonescu³ adopts still another fallacious method of estimating the relative numbers of the

³ *Romanii, Origina, Trecutul, Sacrificiile și Drepturile Lor*, Bucarest, 1919 (p. 31). This book formed a part of the Rumanian argument before the Peace Conference.

different races. His argument runs as follows: Only three races in Transylvania—the Rumanians, Serbs and Ruthenes—belong to the Greek Catholic church. But the Hungarian figures on the membership of that confession are much higher than the total number of Rumanians, Serbs and Ruthenians as stated in the tables by nationalities. Hence, he says, if we subtract from the 3,412,852 Greek Catholics the number of Serbs and Ruthenes given in the Hungarian statistics, we should get the correct number of Rumanians in Transylvania, or 3,103,034. Yet it is evident that this author, who has just refused to accept the Hungarian figures as to the number of Rumanians, adopts them in respect to Serbs and Ruthenians in his subtraction to get the true figure for his own nationality.

The truth is of course somewhere between the widely divergent claims of the two nations at debate in the matter. Obviously only the roughest kind of guess can be made. As to getting an accurate census, according to a clearly understood definition of nationality, we had as well dismiss it at once, since it is at present impossible. We will not be very wide of the truth in estimating the Transylvanian population at half Rumanian, one-fourth Magyar, one-eighth German, plus some other fragments of nationalities, especially Jews and Ruthenians. Now that the Serbs get part of the Banat, they may be said to be practically negligible in the remaining part of this territory.

What is a nationality? No one has yet proposed any generally applicable definition. Evidently it is some quality which attaches to a group of people. Is it a matter of language, of folkways, of actual biological measurements showing heredity, or is it what people of any group to be studied have been taught to say they are? Or is it a combination? For instance there is no dearth of people in the Transylvanian back country who speak Rumanian at home, learn a smattering of Magyar at school and are unaware that being of Rumanian origin has any political significance. Some of these clear in the western rim of the country still build their houses in the Rumanian fashion, others about Kronstadt, near the Rumanian border, build like the Hungarians.

Some people imagine that a question of political allegiance can be simply settled by holding a plebiscite or election. In the first place there are not always two simple alternatives. In Transylvania the question would have to be three-cornered—for adherence, under some terms, to the old union or one with some fragments with the old empire; to join Rumania; or to be independent. Within this there are other choices to be made. If one of these three moves must be made *en bloc*, the decision different groups would make must depend largely on what kind of internal administration is to be set up in each case. This would be influenced by the presence or absence of outside interference. There would have to be outside interference to guarantee a fair election. Any group in charge would almost certainly be able to carry it. Before the Rumanian occupation, this racial group was almost entirely unrepresented in the government. Now the tables are turned, and the others have practically no representation. If an outside power were to hold an election by communities, the real racial units, how much are these to be allowed to decide? If each chooses its own allegiance and form of government, the result will be hopeless confusion. If any larger units are polled, simple plurality must decide. For example, any electoral unit which is 35 per cent German, 40 per cent Rumanian and 25 per cent Magyar would be ruled by 40 per cent, with 60 per cent, a majority, unrepresented. Or a German-Magyar coalition could entirely freeze out the largest single element in the population.

If an election were ordered and not thoroughly supervised by outsiders, this coalition would be almost certain to take place. Transylvania, like many other south-eastern European territories, is stratified by nationality. The bulk of the Rumanians are peasants. The rich, the powerful, the well-educated, the astute, those with administrative experience in the government, are mostly Magyars, Germans and Jews, living in the towns. It would take almost an army of neutrals to carry on a really fair election because of this peculiar stratification of nationalities by occupation. It would be difficult for even a neutral to

remain unbiased, as is evidenced by certain Allied representatives who attempted to study the race problem in such regions in 1919. These of course descended into fair-sized towns, the composition of whose population is very different from that of the surrounding country. When they could not speak the languages of the country, these men naturally formed acquaintances among congenial people who could speak theirs. Here the propagandists got in knockout blows. Without being on the ground, it would be impossible to conceive of the amount of such literature floating about southeastern Europe during the past year. America was at a peculiar disadvantage. We are not a nation of linguists. Most of the Americans who can speak Serbian, Rumanian, Hungarian, Polish or Russian, for example, came from the countries in question, or their parents did. Hence there is a peculiar probability that their minds were biased when they went in.

One might suggest: "Well, why not make the communities themselves autonomous, and set up a general government with chiefly generally-regulative economic functions?" In the first place, this would be fatal from the military point of view, until we can be much more certain than is now possible that the more centralized governments will not commit aggressions. It is not a question of "developing" aggressive tendencies. They are already present. The military point immediately suggests another: Is not war merely one phase of competition, i.e., is it not chiefly economic, representing merely a change of competitive *method*? And is not an organization which lacks the cohesion to successfully wage war by that fact economically weak? That is, if it cannot mobilize its economic resources for one form of activity, how can it for another. Surely, few students have failed to remark and to marvel at the smallness of the Hungarian and Russian soviet armies, relative to the population of the countries. Of course, neither government has been strictly communistic, but both were obliged to approach it more nearly in fact than in theory, due to a preponderance of rural population.

Communistic spirit is, in fact, very strong in many rural sections of Transylvania. The Rumanian civil and military officials have already had some experiences in this connection which were more amusing to a spectator than to themselves. For instance, orders to display flags from all public buildings in towns and communes on certain days were repeatedly defied on the ground that this was an unjustifiable subversion of the inalienable rights of the commune of X——— to take whatever attitude it pleased toward any outside governing group. Once finally rid of their expansionist government, the peoples of the late Dual Monarchy will be found to be astonishingly democratic at heart. Socialism is rampant in the industrial towns—a fact which is already causing some uneasiness in Rumanian government circles.

Rumania faces a very complicated problem in devising a workable economic and political union with Transylvania.⁴ The peculiar form of peasant cooperative which has achieved startling perfection in the Old Kingdom is quite foreign to the new territory. For many years, Bucarest cannot hope to become the real economic capital of Transylvania, whose roads, railways and long-standing habits unite it commercially rather with central Europe. Shall the political union be a loose one, on the federal type, or shall it be organic? Rumania has the French highly centralized type of administration, which may make it difficult for her to work out a federal union with her new possessions. On the other hand, if she should undertake to interfere with the well-established avenues of trade and exchange, or to impose any sort of arbitrary political control, she would risk the hostility of the half of the Transylvanian population least inclined to be loyal to her—the moneyed, directing, non-Rumanian elements. At a moment when the other Allied countries are frantically trying to purge themselves of very small dissenting groups, Rumania and Jugo-

⁴Since this was written, a ministerial crisis and an election have wrought a bloodless revolution in Rumania, leaving the united peasants of Bessarabia, Transylvania and the old Kingdom in control. The new Premier is M. Vaida of Transylvania.

slavia are prevented by the terms of the peace treaty from assuming full and unlimited sovereignty over the aliens most likely to make trouble.

In this respect the Rumanians and the Serbs are pretty much in the same boat. The old governmental organizations were adapted to small countries, with no great industrial or commercial development. They must now administer ex-Austro-Hungarian regions whose populations are used to the rather enlightened economic policies of the late Dual Monarchy. These populations are on an average better educated and used to life on a more complicated plan. They tend to look patronizingly, or even contemptuously on their new governments as "muzzle-loaders," "key-winders," or something of the antiquated sort.

The attitude of the Saxons of Transylvania generally on the question of government is interesting, especially as compared with the ideas which prevailed in the late German Empire. They sent a delegation to the National Assembly which voted the union with Rumania in December, 1918, which stated that they would be loyal to the new government, as they had been to the old; that no government which decently provided for the economic machinery which enabled them to carry on their industrious personal and community activities, achieve honest prosperity and live their cultural lives in peace need entertain any fears of their hostility. In private conversation they voice these sentiments with astonishing frequency. Government to them is a necessary evil—necessary to enforce certain regulations and look after the machinery essential to modern life. They do not appear to care who runs it as long as it subserves these functions and does not get officious.

There is something engaging about the spirit of this philosophy, whether or not it is capable of leading anywhere in practice. Greeks, Jews, Bulgarians, Germans and Russians in Bessarabia frankly expressed the same sentiments to the writer last year. It would be strange if out of the Balkans and the Near East, torn by so much political strife and dynastic war in the past, should come the new tolerance which alone can do away with such

things. These people cannot understand why men should take such a passionate interest in a government—to them a mere subsidiary mechanism maintained by a number of communities to supervise their interrelations—unless it is actively bad.

Transylvania is still an island in civilization. The struggle for economic empire comes only faintly to its ears. While western Europe has crowded itself into cities and compact groups, dependent for their bread and raiment upon the simpler world outside, this loose network of semi-isolated mountain valleys has remained largely self-sufficient. The war, which devastated or disorganized most of the continent, ruining the compact groups because they could not produce their bread and the most primitive exploited by these because they had in their turn become dependent for machines they had learned to use but not to make, eddied about Transylvania, but left it almost untouched. Two invading armies filtered through, but each claimed the country and so left it substantially unscarred. The young men were away on a dimly-comprehended adventure; but the taxes were not high, goods were not particularly scarce, and life went on from 1914 to 1918 almost as before.

When the peace came, artificialized Europe generally looked in despair upon the tangled wreckage of the commercial and industrial fabric upon which the lives of millions depended—starved, smashed, bankrupt. Famine stalked in Vienna, Bucarest, Belgrade, Constantinople, claiming its thousands. On two sides of this territory, Hungary and Russia were in the throes of class war at the same time. Everywhere else, even hope for the future was dying with a generation of rickety, tubercular, famished children. But Transylvania had been the favored land, the mountain-girt heaven in the center of this gigantic hell.

The year 1919 saw the beginnings of a bewildered awakening. Central Europe was paralyzed, which really, seriously hurt trade and business in Transylvania for the first time. The currency had been the Hungarian *Korona*,

now hopelessly debauched. The incoming Rumanian government stamped these Hungarian notes, fixing the value of the crown in Transylvania at half that of the Rumanian *leu* or franc. But the *leu* itself was worth only about a third its normal exchange value, which placed the money of Transylvania at about one-sixth normal. Prices were amazingly low, partially because goods were fairly plentiful, and very largely because of a slow adjustment to this incredible debasement of the currency. Merchants could not realize the ruin and bankruptcy of Europe, so they grew petulant, and blamed the new government for their growing misfortunes. The old régime began to stand in their fond memories for prosperity and industry, "business as usual"—the new one for pinching shortage and a groping uncertainty about the future.

A nice old German-Jew dealer in post-cards and antiquities in Kronstadt expressed this feeling well enough to be worth quoting. In the confidential soft voice of the European small shopkeeper, he wandered on in this wise:

Business is rotten (*sehr schlecht*). . . . Do you not think that the new government is bad? What we should like is as much of the government here in the commune as possible, where we might watch it. Then it would furnish the simple things we ask—protection, exchange—and we should not have to worry about it. I wish the same things of my government that I do of my banker: He must be honest; he must keep books, and run his business in a businesslike way. Then if I do not like his ways, I can get a new one. . . . If I could get a new government as easily as I get a new banker, it would be much better managed. Do you not think so?